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Fighting Under a Different Flag: Multinational 
Naval Cooperation and Submarine Warfare in the 
Mediterranean, 1940–1944

Richard Hammond
Operating in coalitions has become the norm for western militaries. It has been formally recognized by the British government in both the 2010 and 2015 
Strategic Defence and Security Reviews, the first of which acknowledged: “We 
rarely deploy alone. We and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
allies consciously depend on each other for particular capabilities.”1 Such a 
conviction plays an integral role in shaping procurement, long-term planning, and 
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Abstract
The exiled navies of many Allied nations came under British operational 
control in World War II. Six of these contributed significant proportions 
of their submarine fleets to the Mediterranean, where there was great 
need for them, yet troubled relations meant multinational naval coopera-
tion (MNC) was often extremely difficult. British attempts to establish 
structures to improve this were frequently hampered, while perceived 
differing strategic “worth” led the British to treat them in an unequal man-
ner. Ultimately, while MNC was broadly successful in the British home 
theatre, it was much less effective in the Mediterranean and valuable 
resources subsequently went underused.
1. “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review” 
(2010), 20. Similar comments on the importance of partnering were again recognised in “Na-
tional Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review: A Secure and Prosperous 
United Kingdom” (2015); see page 47 for example.
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operating concepts. An example of this relating to the Royal Navy (RN) was the 
decision to optimize the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers for interoperable 
capabilities with allied aircraft, as “we would normally expect to deploy with allies 
such as the US and France; through NATO; or as part of a broader coalition.”2 
Working successfully within coalitions in the maritime environment is clearly 
dependent on effective multinational naval cooperation (MNC). Effective MNC 
must deal not only with technical differences between allies, but also with those 
of languages, cultures, attitudes, operating procedures, and priorities. 
In October 2008, this journal published an excellent article by Mark C. Jones 
on the role of the RN’s Ninth Submarine Flotilla (S9) in fostering effective MNC 
between British and European allies in World War II.3 Free French, Polish, Dutch, 
and Norwegian submarines were placed in this flotilla under British operational 
control and worked alongside RN vessels. Jones convincingly demonstrates that 
despite difficulties such as different languages, cultures, equipment, and tactics, 
the unit became “an important example of a multinational naval force.”4 It is his 
contention that S9 laid the foundations for effective MNC in NATO, when it 
was formed shortly after the war. 
As Jones’s article is based around the genesis, operations, and workings of 
S9 at Dundee, the article focuses on the British home theatre and the Atlantic. 
This article will examine the much larger number of Allied submarines that 
were placed under British operational control in the Mediterranean, and the 
situation surrounding MNC there. A total of 67 came under British control 
between 1940 and 1944, accounting for 39 percent of the 173 submarines 
used by the RN in the Mediterranean. It was a truly multinational contingent, 
consisting of 15 French, 5 Greek, 4 Dutch, 2 Polish, 1 Yugoslavian, and no 
fewer than 40 Italian submarines.5
The Mediterranean saw the greatest concentration of Allied submarines under 
British control in the war. Jones’s claim that “it seems likely that the RN decided 
to concentrate most of the foreign boats that were fit for combat operations in one 
flotilla, S9,” is true in that S9 held the largest proportion of Allied submarines of 
any individual flotilla, but the overall number and proportion in the home theatre 
was far less than in the Mediterranean.6 The diversity of these forces has also been 
underestimated; these submarines were from six different nations, equal to that 
2. “A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom,” 29, 51–52.
3. Mark C. Jones, “Experiment at Dundee: The Royal Navy’s 9th Submarine Flotilla and 
Multinational Naval Co-operation during World War II,” Journal of Military History 72, no. 4 
(2008): 1179–1212.
4. Ibid., 1211.
5. The figures given were compiled by the author, based on the Admiralty “pink lists” from 
June 1940 to December 1944. These are comprehensive lists of Royal and Allied Navy locations 
and movements on a monthly basis, in ADM 187/8-44, The National Archives, Kew, United 
Kingdom (hereafter TNA).
6. Jones, “Experiment at Dundee,” 1193.
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housed within S9. Michael Wilson has stated that that the Indian Ocean was 
unique in submarine warfare, as it saw submarine forces of seven different nations 
from both sides operating there.7 Yet this number was actually less than those 
in the Mediterranean, with the six nations mentioned above counted alongside 
British and German forces. That such a high proportion of the total number 
should be Allied vessels makes it particularly surprising that they have received so 
little scholarly attention. 
Official and general histories of the war at sea in the theatre tend to make 
only passing mention of the Allied vessels.8 Histories of the RN submarine service 
or of submarine operations in the war add some additional, largely operational, 
information.9 Papers and memoirs of British officers in the theatre, from theatre 
commanders down to submarine commanders, have provided some details on 
policy and attitudes towards them.10 The remaining secondary literature largely 
deals with each of the individual navies or submarine services, most of which 
focus directly on operations and contain little on the question of MNC.11
7. Michael Wilson, A Submariner’s War: The Indian Ocean, 1939–1945 (Stroud: Tempus, 
2000), 13.
8. See, for instance, S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–1945, 3 vols. (London: Naval and 
Military Press, 2004); Correlli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the 
Second World War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); Donald McIntyre, The Battle for the Mediter-
ranean (London: Batsford, 1975); Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, The Naval War in 
the Mediterranean (London: Chatham, 1998). The most information to be gained on the minor 
nations from these general histories is in Vincent P. O’Hara, Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great 
Navies at War in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945 (London: Conway, 2009). 
9. There is much to be gained on operational aspects from the relevant unpublished Naval 
Staff History (hereafter NSH) that can be found in NSH, Submarines: Volume 2—Operations 
in the Mediterranean, 1956, ADM 234/381, TNA; see also S. May, “The British Submarine 
Campaign in the Mediterranean, 1940–43” (Mphil thesis, University of Swansea, 2000); Arthur 
Hezlet, British and Allied Submarine Operations in World War 2, 2 vols. (Gosport: Royal Navy 
Submarine Museum, 2001); Derek Walters, The History of the British U-Class Submarine (Barn-
sley: Pen and Sword, 2004), 155–83, provides a specific narrative overview of Allied submarine 
operations, limited to those in “U” Class submarines. 
10. See Michael Simpson, ed., The Cunningham Papers, 2 vols. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, 2006); 
G. W. G. Simpson, Periscope View: A Professional Autobiography (London: Macmillan, 1972); John 
Wingate, The Fighting Tenth: The Tenth Submarine Flotilla and the Siege of Malta (London: Periscope 
Publishing, 2003); Edward P. Young, One of Our Submarines (London: Hart-Davis, 1953); William 
D. E. King, The Stick and the Stars (London: Hutchinson, 1958); Ben Bryant, One Man Band: Memoirs 
of a Submarine C.O. (London: William Kimber, 1958); Alistair G. C. Mars, British Submarines at War, 
1939–45 (London: William Kimber, 1971); John O. Coote, Submariner (New York: Norton, 1991).
11. On the French, see Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy in World War 
Two (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1959); Phillipe Masson, Histoire de la marine. Tome 
II: De la vapeur a l ’atome (Paris: Charles Lavazelle, 1992); Michel Bertrand, Les Forces Navales 
Francaises Libres (Paris: Argout, 1980); Claude Huan, “The French Navy in World War 2,” in 
Re-evaluating Major Naval Combatants of World War 2, ed. James J. Sadkovich (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood, 1990). For the French and Free French navies specifically in the Mediterranean, see 
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C. F. Caroff, La Theatre Mediterraneen, 2 vols. (Paris: SHM, 1958–60); for French submarines, 
see Huan, Les Sous-Marins Francais 1919–45 (Rennes: Marines Editions, 1996).
For the Greek navy in general, see Procopis Papastratis, “A Fighting Navy in Exile: The 
Greek Fleet in the Mediterranean and Beyond,” in New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected 
Papers from the Tenth Naval History Symposium, ed. J. Sweetman. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1991), 363–73; there is also useful information on the Greek navy in the Mediterra-
nean in O’Hara, Struggle for the Middle Sea; and some detail relating to cooperation in Reginald 
Leeper, When Greek meets Greek (London: Chatto and Windus, 1950). 
Sources on Dutch submarine history, including their operations in the Mediterranean, 
are C. J. W. van Waning and J. J. Leeflang, eds., Wegduiken! De Nederlandse Onderzeedienst, 
1906–1966 (The Hague: Zuid-Hollandsche, 1967); and Piet C. Jalhay and Gerard Horneman, 
Periscoop Op!: Nederlandse Onderzeebooten (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2006). On the 
Dutch navy in exile more generally, see the official histories: Ph. M. Bosscher, De Koninklijke 
Marine in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 3 vols. (Franeker: T. Wever, 1984–90). 
A general source which contains much on the Polish navy in exile is Michael A. Peszke, 
Poland’s Navy, 1918–1945 (New York: Hippocrene, 1999); while Wanda Troman, “Anglo-Polish 
Naval Relations, 1918–1947” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2000), contains a chapter on 
the Second World War. See also Jerzy Bedzmirowski, “Co-operation Between the Royal Navy 
and the Polish Navy during World War II Regarding the Education of Naval Cadres,” Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 21 (2008): 657–68; and the memoirs of one Polish submarine commander 
who served in the Mediterranean: Borys Karnicki, Marynarski Worek Wspomnien (Warsaw: Min-
isterstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1987).
Marc’ Antonio Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute 
Press, 1957), includes a narrative chapter on the “co-belligerency” period. For works in Italian, 
see the multi-authored Italian official history La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale 
(LMI), 21 vols. (Rome: Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare [USMM], 1950–1978), especially 
vol. 21, G. Fioravanzo, L’organizzazione della Marina Durante il Conflitto Tomo III: I problemi 
organici durante il periodo armistiziale (1978); Giovanni Bernardi, La Marina, gli armistizi e il 
trattato di pace, settembre 1943–dicembre 1951 (Rome: USMM, 1979).
The effort of coordinating such a large multinational effort is worthy of 
study, but it has been largely ignored to date. This is possibly to do with the 
rather unsuccessful nature of MNC there, which stands in stark contrast to 
the fruitful efforts of S9. By focusing on the situation and circumstances in the 
Mediterranean different to that of the home theatre, this article will demonstrate 
that while there were some successes, the difficulties of MNC were much greater 
in the Mediterranean and were not overcome to anything like the extent they 
were in S9. This was due to the fractious nature of relations between some of the 
different nations, particularly relating to those that were formerly hostile neutrals 
or enemies—the ex-Vichy French and the Italians. This, coupled with technical 
problems and differing British attitudes of the strategic “worth” of the various 
nations, meant manpower and resources were under-utilized.
This study is presented in four broad sections. First, it will explore the 
importance of submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, and thus where the 
Allied vessels could contribute. Second, it will chart when, how, and why these 
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12. Nigel John Gilbert, “British Submarine Operations in World War 2,” United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings 89, no 3 (1963): 73. 
13. Wilson, A Submariner’s War, 145–46.
14. For lists of Japanese warships and shipping of over 500 tons sunk by RN and Dutch 
submarines, see NSH, Submarines: Volume 3—Operations in the Far East, 1956, 114–18, ADM 
234/382, TNA.
15. O’Hara, Struggle for the Middle Sea, 8.
submarines came to be under British operational control and demonstrate 
their changing proportion of the overall total of submarines throughout the 
campaign. Their operations and overall levels of activity compared to those of 
the RN will be examined before assessing their contribution to the campaign. 
Third, the nature of MNC in the UK will be established before the final section 
examines the nature of it in the Mediterranean. This will place the contribution 
of the Allied vessels in the context of the serious political difficulties that existed 
for MNC in the Mediterranean, and so resulted in a worse outcome than that 
in the home theatre.
Submarine Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940–1944
The RN’s submarines were often not used to their full potential during the 
war. Despite being an offensive weapon, they were frequently utilized on other, 
less suited tasks. In Home and Atlantic waters, they were regularly tied to roles 
such as close blockade of German naval units, convoy escort, anti-raider, and 
anti-U-boat patrols. Only during the Norwegian campaign of 1940 did they 
take a sustained offensive against the German navy and invasion shipping. It 
was, as one historian has aptly put it, “a regrettable misuse of specialist ships.”12 
In the Far East, the RN was initially restricted to patrols in the Indian Ocean 
and South China Sea in 1943–1944. With little presence of the Japanese navy 
or their supply shipping, it was a less fruitful hunting ground than the Pacific. 
The sighting of any shipping larger than a 500-ton coaster was a rarity.13 An 
extension of their operations further east from late 1944 brought some further 
opportunities, but the combination of a lack of genuinely high endurance, 
long-range ocean-going submarines and the attrition to the Japanese meant 
little could be achieved.14 
It was only in the Mediterranean that RN submarines were consistently used in 
their offensive capacity. Here a rich vein of targets existed, and the enclosed nature 
of the theatre complemented the smaller, shorter-range submarines employed by 
the British. The Axis sea lines of communication between Italy and North Africa 
offered a prime target and an opportunity to definitively influence the war in the 
desert. The importance of this route had been acknowledged by the Admiralty 
when planning for the possibility of war with Italy, and highlighted as a major 
objective.15 As the war progressed, the importance of submarines to interdicting 
this shipping was quickly recognized by the RN’s Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) 
Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew Cunningham. He regularly requested more be 
RICHARD HAMMOND
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16. For Cunningham’s quote, see C-in-C Mediterranean to Admiralty, 19 September 1941, 
AIR 8/961, WX. 2604, TNA. 
For appeals for more submarines, see COS(41) 10th “O” meeting, 4 April 1941, CAB 
79/555, TNA; 27th “O” meeting, 25 August 1941.
17. Organisation of Allied Naval, Army and Air Contingents, 16 April 1941, 4, CAB 
66/16/9, TNA; S. May, “Strangling Rommel: British Submarine Commanders in the Mediter-
ranean,” Mariner’s Mirror 88, no. 4 (2002): 466. 
18. COS(42) 121st meeting, 16 April 1942, CAB 79/20, TNA; 133rd meeting, 28 April 
1942.
19. Giorgio Giorgerini, La battaglia dei convogli in Mediterraneo (Milan: Mursia, 1977), 
235.
20. O’Hara, Struggle for the Middle Sea, 8; Cunningham to the Admiralty, 16 July 1940, in 
Simpson, ed., The Cunningham Papers, 114–15; COS(40) Memorandum 647, “Future Strategy,” 
21 August 1940, 38, CAB 80/16, TNA.
transferred to his command, and went so far as to say in the autumn of 1941 that 
“Every submarine that can be spared is worth its weight in gold.”16 
On the Italian declaration of war, 10 June 1940, there had been a single 
submarine flotilla (S1) based at Alexandria, Egypt, with a sub-command at 
Malta. This was soon expanded with the creation of another (S8) at Gibraltar 
in December, as part of an increased effort by the RN to interdict shipping 
from Italy to the Axis forces in North Africa, to act as an overseas training/
working up unit for submarines in the theatre, and to serve as escorts to Atlantic 
convoys.17 The much-increased sub-command at Malta was then made into an 
independent flotilla (S10) in September 1941. Even when Axis aerial superiority 
had forced the withdrawal of submarines based at Malta in 1942, a proposal to 
withdraw one of the three flotillas from the Mediterranean was unanimously 
rejected by the British Chiefs of Staff as they remained the best possible option 
to attack Axis shipping.18
Yet these submarines were not important just for interrupting Axis 
communications with North Africa, nor did the need for them end with the 
climax of the Tunisian campaign in May 1943. In fact, while 993 convoys were 
run between Italy and North Africa, totalling 9,245,171 tons of shipping, 
there were 3,116 convoys totalling 19,379,786 tons to Albania, Greece, and 
the Aegean up to the Italian armistice, 8 September 1943.19 These convoys 
were vital to supplying the Axis positions in the Balkans and across the Aegean 
islands. The interruption of Italian communications through the Aegean had 
been identified alongside those with North Africa as a prewar objective. 
Cunningham outlined his intention to attack them in the summer of 1940, 
and a cabinet memorandum on “future strategy” shortly followed that argued 
for the importance of attacking shipping in the Aegean.20 Declarations of 
“sink at sight” zones followed over 1940 and 1941, opening up areas to attack 
Axis shipping without warning beyond the North African routes and into 
the Adriatic and Aegean. The area between Southern France and Corsica was 
opened as an “operational zone” for submarines in November 1942 in order 
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21. See Richard Hammond, “British Policy on Total Maritime Warfare and the Anti-Ship-
ping Campaign in the Mediterranean, 1940–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 6 (2013): 
797; DO(42) 17th meeting, 16 November 1942, annex on “Extension of sink at sight zone to 
Franco-Spanish border,” CAB 69/4, TNA.
22. Sixth Report by the Reichkommisar for Shipping, 6 June 1943, 41, FD 4195/45, Impe-
rial War Museum, Duxford; Eighth Report by the Reichkommisar for Shipping, 13 December 
1943, 62.
23. Extract from COS(43) 264th meeting, 29 October 1943, ADM 199/1340, TNA.
24. C-in-C Levant to Admiralty, 3 October 1943, ADM 223/584, TNA; “Naval Opera-
tions in the Aegean, 7 September–28 November 1943,” 27 December 1943, p. 20, WLLS 6-2, 
Private Papers of Admiral Algernon Willis, Churchill College Archive Centre, Cambridge. 
25. See, for instance, Andrew Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London: Hutchinson, 1951), 
557, for details on their role in the landings on Sicily.
26. NSH, Submarines, vol. 2, 259, ADM 234/381, TNA.
to allow further interdiction of Axis shipping to Corsica and Sardinia and to 
deter Spanish trade with the Axis.21
 Although the scope for submarine operations certainly decreased after the 
Axis surrender in Tunisia, the need for submarines persisted in order to attack 
communications with Sardinia and Corsica in the Adriatic and the Aegean and 
along the coasts of Italy and southern France. In June 1943 there were still 350,000 
tons of remaining Italian large vessels, about 800 small vessels of 50 to 500 tons, 
and large numbers of very small coasters. Even after the Italian armistice, the 
Germans still retained 185 vessels of 575,000 tons, although some of it was no 
longer seaworthy or consisted of large passenger liners unsuited to the narrower 
waters they were now operating in. This shipping was seen as vital by the Germans 
to maintain their position in the Mediterranean.22 
The continued need for submarines was clearly recognised by those both at 
Whitehall and in theatre. A proposal (later cancelled) by Prime Minister Winston 
S. Churchill to withdraw five from the eastern Mediterranean and send them the 
Black Sea to assist the Russians came with the caveat that he did not wish the total 
Mediterranean strength to be reduced.23 The C-in-C Levant, Admiral Algeron 
Willis, called for more submarines in October 1943, and urged greater use of all 
arms to build on inroads made into Axis shipping during the failed campaign 
to take and hold the Dodecanese islands.24 Along with attacks on shipping and 
remaining German naval units, the submarines conducted storing operations, 
special operations to land agents and Special Forces, and location work to aid the 
various amphibious landings.25 Submarine operations of all types continued until 
November 1944, when the C-in-C Mediterranean ordered that no more offensive 
patrols take place.26 After that, only non-combat operations continued. 
The Numbers and Contribution of Allied Submarines in the Mediterranean
The graph shown in Figure One (next page) displays the changing average 
weekly totals of British and Allied submarines present in the Mediterranean each 
month, from June 1940 to December 1944. It shows two lines: one for the total 
RICHARD HAMMOND
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27. This graph shows averages compiled from the listings given for each month from June 
1940 to December 1944 in the Admiralty “pink lists,” ADM 187/8-44, TNA. It should be noted 
that this includes only Allied submarines that were under British operational control, and so not, 
for example, Greek submarines prior to Greek capitulation.
28. NSH, Submarines, vol. 2, 2, ADM 234/381, TNA; Auphan and Mordal, French Navy, 
159.
29. Admiralty pink list entry for 2 April 1941, ADM 187/12, TNA; Admiralty pink list 
entry for 2 May 1941, ADM 187/13, TNA.
30. Roskill, War at Sea, 1:434; Papastratis, “Fighting Navy in Exile,” 365.
31. NSH, Submarines, vol. 2, 27–32, ADM 234/381, TNA. Operation Battleaxe took place 
in June 1941.
32. Admiralty pink list entry for 2 January 1942, ADM 187/17, TNA.
33. NSH, Submarines, vol. 2, 100–110, ADM 234/381, TNA.
number of British and Allied submarines in the Mediterranean, and one specifically 
for the number of Allied submarines under British operational control.27 The chart 
clearly indicates not only that there was an increasing presence of Allied submarines 
over the course of the submarine campaign in the Mediterranean, but also that they 
represented an increasing proportion of the total number of vessels in the theatre.
The first Allied submarine to come under RN operational control in the 
Mediterranean was the Free French Narval. In the immediate aftermath of the 
French armistice, 22 June 1940,  this was the only submarine out of the forty-
six they had in the theatre to join the British, sailing to Malta from Tunisia at 
the first opportunity.28 There were no new additions until the arrival of three 
Dutch submarines in late March and early April 1941, detached from S9 and 
sent to bolster the newly formed S8 at Gibraltar. One Yugoslav and five Greek 
submarines became new additions the next month.29 During the closing stages 
of the German-led offensive, the Greek vessels were placed under the command 
of C-in-C Mediterranean and managed to escape to Alexandria.30 Despite these 
additions, the Allied submarines did not represent a greater proportion of the 
overall number. Instead, greater RN numbers were sent to the theatre, in order 
to interdict Axis shipping to North Africa in support of the coming British and 
Commonwealth land offensive in Libya—Operation Battleaxe.31 
Little changed for the remainder of 1941, as vessels were variously transferred 
in and out. There was a new arrival in the form of the Polish ORP Sokol in 
September, detached from S9, but two of the Dutch submarines then left the 
theatre in early 1942.32 The total number of submarines rose significantly from 
August to December, to take a role in Operation Torch—the Allied landings in 
North Africa. Here they were utilized in roles including guarding against a sortie 
by the Italian navy, escorting the invasion convoys, and acting as location markers 
for the landings themselves in November.33 This increase was primarily RN vessels 
though, and the Allied proportion of the overall total decreased. January to March 
1943 saw some increase in the proportion of Allied vessels, rising from 13 percent 
in December 1942 to 25 percent in March 1943, although the actual number of 
RICHARD HAMMOND
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34. Admiralty pink list entries for April 1943, ADM 187/24, TNA.
35. Admiralty pink list entries for December 1943, ADM 187/31, TNA. 
36. “Disposal and Employment of Surrendered Italian Submarines,” minute of 31 October 
1943, ADM 1/13300, TNA; “Proposed Employment of French Naval Vessels,” 6–7, 12. 
37. Admiral Submarines: Statistics, “Summary of British and Allied Submarine Operations 
1944,” 4, ADM 199/1926, TNA.
Allied submarines remained in single figures. This had included the first additions 
of French submarines in January, and numbers swelled with further additions up 
to April.34 These, along with the arrival of the Polish Dzik, were the reason that 
the proportion of Allied vessels passed 50 percent for the first time in May. 
The dramatic Allied increase in November 1943 represents the Italian 
submarines. Italy had signed the armistice in September and declared war on 
Germany in October, being given status as a “co-belligerent” to the Allies. As such, 
the Italian vessels do not appear in the Admiralty “pink lists” until November. A 
total of forty Italian submarines that had escaped destruction or German seizure 
came under British control by December, not including the “midget submarines.”35 
At the start of 1944, vessels from Allied nations constituted around 80 percent of 
the total British and Allied submarine force. In April, numbers dropped heavily 
as twenty-three French and Italian vessels left the theatre for a variety of reasons: 
some went to other theatres of war and some were sent for extensive repairs and 
refits at better equipped stations outside of the Mediterranean, whilst some of the 
Italian vessels in particularly bad states of repair were scrapped.36 However, as RN 
submarines were also exiting the theatre, the proportion remained little changed. 
From May to the end of the year, Allied vessels represented between 81 and 96 
percent of the submarines in the theatre. The RN submarines had mostly either 
returned to Home waters, or moved on to the Far East.37
The contribution of the Allied submarines to the war in the Mediterranean can 
be assessed by examining two criteria: their level of activity and their achievements 
on operations. The activity of the vessels is measured through calculating the 
proportion of the total number of Allied vessels that were at sea throughout the 
submarine campaign. This can then be compared to the activity levels of the RN 
submarines. Figures Two (opposite) and Three (next page) demonstrate these 
average weekly quantities each month, and paint completely different pictures. 
Throughout the campaign, there were regularly 50 percent or more of the RN 
submarines in the theatre actually at sea. This demonstrates a very active role there, 
as following any period at sea, a submarine must spend time in port for refueling and 
refitting, and possibly also rearming and repairs, not to mention rest and paperwork 
for the crews, before being able to set sail again. At particularly important times 
during the campaign they were exceptionally active with over 75 percent, an example 
being July 1943, which saw increased activity prior to and during the invasion of 
Sicily. Periods of low activity were very rare and generally with a clear reason. For 
instance, the lack of vessels at sea during June and July 1942 was the result of the 
final stages of the heaviest bombing of Malta by the Axis, forcing the submarines 
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of S10 stationed there to stay underwater in port during the daytime, and making 
entering or leaving the port very hazardous.38 They were later forced to withdraw 
from the island, while a rapid Axis advance in North Africa also prompted the 
withdrawal of S1 from their base at Alexandria to Haifa and Beirut.
Figure Three demonstrates a clear difference in the level of activity of Allied 
submarines compared to those of the Royal Navy. Excluding the brief but very 
active existence of the Narval in 1940, it was very rare for the Allied vessels to 
reach, let alone exceed, 50 percent activity. In 1941–1942 there was a steady, if 
often low, level of activity. It is in the examination of 1943–1944 that the low level 
of activity of the Allied submarines becomes truly apparent. Overall activity of 
Allied submarines did increase in this period; from March 1943 onwards there 
were always two or more submarines at sea. December was the first month to 
see more Allied submarines at sea than those of the RN, and this was a frequent 
occurrence in 1944 when few RN vessels remained. Activity levels reached double 
figures for the first time from January to April 1944. 
This increased activity must be seen in context though. By May the addition 
of French vessels, coupled with the return of some Dutch and Polish submarines 
to the theatre, meant that there were twenty-three Allied submarines available, yet 
only five were at sea.39 The figures become even more widely separated at the end 
of 1943. Whilst the nine Allied submarines at sea in December represented the 
greatest number to that date, the addition of the Italian submarine force meant 
that the total number of Allied submarines in the theatre that month was actually 
fifty-nine.40 Despite the increased activity throughout 1944, the ratio of Allied 
submarines at sea to the total available was extremely low and never recovered. 
A total of 773 (1,194,240 gross registered tons [GRT]) merchant ships of all 
types were sunk by submarine and 184 (438,772 GRT) damaged, with 123 warships 
of all types destroyed.41 They had indeed proven to be “worth their weight in gold” 
as Cunningham had claimed, but it was not just the British who appreciated this. 
Their success had caused grave concern among senior Axis personnel during the 
war in North Africa, who regularly acknowledged the danger they posed and the 
losses to vital supplies they caused, and frequently demanded greater efforts be 
made to counter them. This even led to the creation of a whole new Italian school 
for anti-submarine warfare in late 1941.42 Concerns continued over 1943–1944, 
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with submarine sinkings often causing the suspension of shipping traffic, while the 
combined threat of submarines and surface forces caused the German operation 
to retake Leros to be temporarily suspended.43 
Yet of the totals, submarines from Allied nations sank only 79 merchant and 
supply vessels (80,231 GRT) of all types when under British control, and damaged 
a further 19 (63,826 GRT). They also sank two U-boats, one destroyer, and ten 
auxiliary warships of all types. This can be compared to the following total figures 
for submarines of the RN: 694 merchant vessels (1,114,009 GRT) sunk and 165 
(374,946 GRT) damaged. They also sank nineteen U-boats, three cruisers, seven 
destroyers, eight torpedo boats, and one corvette, as well as a total of seventy-two 
naval auxiliaries. Allied submarines accounted for 10 percent of the total number 
and 7 percent of the total tonnage of merchant vessels sunk, as well as 10 percent 
of the total number and 15 percent of the total tonnage damaged in the theatre. 
Considering the numbers of Allied submarines available throughout the period, 
these statistics reflect poor totals, but are hardly surprising given such low activity. 
The source material also shows the Allied successes were almost entirely from 
the Greek, Dutch, and Polish submarines. The primary reason for this disparity 
in activity and achievement is the environment surrounding MNC in the 
Mediterranean, which was more complex than that faced in the home theatre and 
resulted in the low activity of those crewed by the Allied nations.
The Nature of Multinational Naval Cooperation in the UK
The arrival in Britain of naval units from the various defeated nations took 
place over a relatively short period of time. Polish vessels, including several 
submarines, escaped to Britain over September and October 1939. French vessels 
and personnel, along with those from Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium, 
were transferred to or escaped to Britain between April and June 1940.44 All 
the Allied submarines in the home theatre had arrived over the course of eight 
months, and the majority over the course of just four. 
The Polish naval forces in exile found fairly rapid acceptance from and integration 
within the RN. Anglo-Polish naval relations were rather distant in the 1920s, while 
improvements in the 1930s were gradual, primarily for fear of antagonizing German 
leader Adolf Hitler. However, as Wanda Troman has noted, Anglo-Polish staff talks 
and planning did set the foundations for Polish warships to operate from Britain 
throughout the coming war.45 After the defeat of Poland in September 1939, the 
remainder of the Polish navy quickly concentrated in British ports. The Polish naval 
Headquarters (HQ) was soon transferred to London and a new Anglo-Polish 
Naval Agreement was signed in November. It outlined procedures for the continued 
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operation of Polish naval forces under British control, and for future lending of RN 
warships to the Polish forces in exile.46
When the other exiled navies began to arrive in April and May 1940, the 
transition to a foundation for continued MNC was a little more labored. Questions 
were raised of the trustworthiness of Belgian, Dutch, and Norwegian personnel, 
and it was the subject of a meeting at the Admiralty in May 1940. Multiple 
senior officer raised concerns on this issue, with C-in-C Portsmouth and the Vice 
Admiral (Submarines) expressing particular concern over the trustworthiness 
of Dutch and Norwegian personnel. Others, including the Assistant Director 
for Naval Intelligence, pointed to what was seen as a “defeatist spirit.”47 It was 
suggested that Dutch cruisers and destroyers should be sent to U.S. stations under 
RN command, while their submarines should be used only for anti-submarine 
(A/S) training purposes based in Portland. Their proximity in Home waters would 
allow a close eye to be kept on them, and so “the risk of traitorous action would be 
reduced to a minimum.”48
After the fall of France, attitudes were quick to soften within the Admiralty. 
Starved of major allies, Britain would clearly need all the available men and materiel 
to continue the war. Agreements for MNC were put in place with the Allied nations 
along the lines of that with Poland. An office was also created at the Admiralty 
to deal with administrative and liaison matters toward the exiled navies on 2 July. 
Admiral Gerald Dickens was placed in charge, in a position that was later to become 
known as the Principal Naval Liaison Officer (PNLO).49 As a great advocate of 
using these exiled navies, he pointed to the potential they offered in light of urgent 
need for manpower and warships, stating in an early report: “The object, as I see it, 
is to make the best use of these Allied seamen for the common cause.”50 He went 
on to criticise the tendency to view these men as possible fifth columnists, arguing 
they wished to see Axis defeat just as much. In light of the new situation, he received 
widespread agreement, albeit with many reservations regarding the French.51
Questions over the loyalty of the 12,000 or so French sailors in the UK after 
the armistice were rife. When offered the opportunity to join the emerging Free 
French Naval Forces (FFNF), few accepted. Offers to join the RN also received very 
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few responses. The sailors’ concerns were primarily over families in occupied France 
and a duty to the Vichy Regime and existing navy, so the vast majority opted to be 
repatriated.52 After the British seizure of French vessels in their ports in July, and the 
British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-kebir, remaining hopes for volunteers 
were virtually extinguished, and many more Frenchmen were interned.
By mid-July, the framework was set for MNC in the UK. Polish, Norwegian, 
Dutch, and Free French vessels would operate, manned by their own personnel, 
under British operational control. Belgian and Danish personnel and fishing 
vessels also joined the war effort. Vichy French warships had been seized and 
personnel either repatriated or interned, although the door was left open for further 
volunteers. The use of these Allied men and craft did not just aid the troubles of 
British resource and manpower shortages, but also helped present the continuing 
struggle against the Axis as a legitimate international cause. As Churchill put it:
It is the settled policy of His Majesty’s government to make good 
strong French contingents for land, sea and air service, to encourage 
these men to volunteer to fight on with us or with [Free French 
leader Charles] De Gaulle . . . The same principle applies to the 
Polish, Dutch, Czech, Norwegian and Belgian contingents within 
this country . . . It is most necessary to give the war which Great 
Britain is waging single-handed the broad, international character 
which will add greatly to our strength and prestige.53
Each of the Allied navies had its own HQ based in London, and a British 
Naval Liaison Officer (BNLO) was to work there with them. The one exception 
was the Dutch, who sent their own representative to the Admiralty instead.54 
While policy regarding the Allied navies at different levels was formulated in the 
standard manner from the government and/or Admiralty, the PNLO advised on 
such issues. He and his office also worked to smooth relations between the different 
navies themselves, and between them and the RN. This varied from issues over 
equipment, to welfare, through to organising and attending social functions.55 
More junior BNLOs served on each individual vessel to ensure communications 
security and the correct interpretation of orders. 
It was in this atmosphere for MNC that the RN was able to quickly concentrate 
the Allied submarines into S9. By concentrating these forces into a single flotilla, 
the RN was able to minimize the security, linguistic, and technical difficulties of 
inter-operability. While each crew could operate at sea in their own language, 
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English was quickly instituted as the main language for orders and shore duties, 
and housing the various crews in close proximity aided learning of English and 
adaption to British ways of life and service. This level of close integration helped 
aid relations between all involved and made it easier for the British to administer 
to the needs of each of them. It also helped to further soften British attitudes of 
distrust and superiority towards the Allied nations. 
After the initial suspicions of the Dutch and the suggestion that their navy be 
heavily restricted in its operations, attitudes and policy changed with remarkable 
swiftness. In late July 1940, the PNLO recorded that “Nothing but good 
reports are received about the Dutch [navy],” and singled out their submarines 
in particular for efficiency and handling. He suggested that Dutch officers and 
men be treated in the same regard as those in the RN and restrictions on their 
operations be lifted.56 This was quickly implemented, allowing the later transfer 
of Dutch submarines to operate in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Perhaps the 
greatest indicator of changed attitudes and policy was the willingness to transfer 
British warships to the Allied navies to allow continued or increased contribution 
to the war effort. Multiple warships were leant, in line with the terms of the 1940 
Anglo-Dutch naval agreement, including four submarines. The Dolfijn, which saw 
success in the Mediterranean, was one of these.
Like the Dutch, the Polish were repeatedly praised for high morale and 
courage, and believed to be a well-trained fighting force. After the French 
capitulation, the Polish were allowed to take control of several of the French 
surface warships interned in Britain, and were later given British warships to man 
as well, including the light cruiser HMS Dragon. The transfer of such a large and 
important warship to a small navy in exile was the first of its kind, and a clear 
demonstration of the value the British placed in the Polish.57 Right from the start 
the Polish submarines were singled out for being particularly efficient, with the 
BNLO assigned to the submarine Wilk reporting that it was “A first class unit of 
the flotilla. Officers and men have settled into the life of the flotilla and wish to 
man another submarine when available.”58
Among the British vessels given to the Polish were “U” class submarines to 
replace their own losses and to allow the utilization of highly skilled spare crews. 
The Polish submariners had already impressed the RN with their initial escape 
in 1939 and subsequent operations in the home theatre. As such, a “U” class 
was transferred in January 1941 and renamed Sokol. British policy towards the 
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Polish navy was sufficiently malleable that Sokol was sent to the Mediterranean 
despite Poland not actually being at war with Italy!59 After the loss of one of their 
original vessels and the laying up of another, it was suggested by the Vice Admiral 
(Submarines) that an additional “U” class should be leant to them. He pointed to 
the consistently positive reports of Sokol from operations with S10, and suggested 
Polish morale would be dented from only having a single operational submarine. 
The suggestion brought immediate agreement across the Admiralty and was 
subsequently approved, resulting in the Dzik.60 Sokol and the Dzik operated on 
the “front line” of the Mediterranean, in the most important and dangerous areas, 
mainly out of Malta with S10 against the vital Axis supply lines to North Africa. 
Their successes there gained them the nickname of “the terrible twins,” and they 
received much praise from their flotilla commanders and the C-in-C Levant for 
their efficiency, fighting spirit, and inspirational leaders.61
Thanks to the progress made in MNC in the home theatre, the lack of 
significant political barriers to their use, and successful operations with S9, 
Dutch and Polish submarines were able to integrate and operate effectively in the 
Mediterranean. Much weightier problems existed relating to the Greeks, French, 
and Italians.
The Nature of Multinational Naval Cooperation in the Mediterranean
When the Narval joined the British, the situation for MNC was simple. 
It represented an extension of Churchill’s declared policy of demonstrating an 
effort of United Nations and supporting a strong Free French. The reason for the 
“defection” of the Narval from Vichy was given as the strong anti-fascist and pro–
De Gaulle feelings of the commanding officer, François Drogou, and many of the 
crew. Drogou was known to keep a private diary and to correspond with his wife, 
both of which affirmed his strong desire to fight on for Free France.62 The Narval 
was incorporated into the section of S1 based at Malta and allowed to operate 
with relative freedom until its loss. Similarly, the Dutch and Polish submarines 
that arrived from 1941 onwards were quickly assimilated, having already been a 
part of successful MNC within S9. The addition of the Yugoslav submarine had 
no impact on MNC simply because it appears to have spent virtually the entire 
war in port. Admiral Cunningham cited serious mechanical problems and a half-
trained crew in determining this approach.63 
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Initially, there was little to hamper MNC regarding the Greeks, and in fact 
there was a good foundation for it in recent history. British personnel had been 
involved quite closely with the training of Greek naval personnel since before the 
First World War. Between the Italian invasion in 1940 and the Axis conquest of 
Greece in 1941, the British had cooperated with Greek naval units on several 
operations in the Adriatic and Aegean to satisfactory effect.64 The addition of the 
Greek navy was particularly welcomed, as the need for warships was acute after 
the disastrous Allied losses over Greece and Crete. The Greeks also had several 
other advantages as an ally; the Mediterranean was their home theatre, and thus 
they were very familiar with the region and could provide local knowledge. Their 
small submarine force had also operated against the Italian supply lines in the 
Adriatic with some success, and so had relevant combat experience. 
Unlike those of the other Allied nations to date, the Greek government-in-
exile was split between Cairo and London, with significant elements and the armed 
forces at the former but the king and prime minister at the latter until joining the 
rest in 1943.65 Keeping the Greek armed forces based in the eastern Mediterranean 
was logical, as Greece’s interests were overridingly based there, and Egypt had a 
sizeable Greek population. The Greek navy was thus dealt with more directly by the 
C-in-C Mediterranean for matters of MNC, rather than from London. There was 
little contact with the MNC structure based in the UK beyond the training of new 
personnel or the commissioning of new vessels there, and this disconnect was later 
acknowledged by the PNLO.66 For this reason of disconnection, a formal agreement 
for military cooperation along the lines of that with Poland or the Netherlands was 
not initially sought. The fact that Greece was a purely Middle Eastern power, and so 
likely to raise and train forces primarily in areas that were not sovereign UK territory, 
was at first deemed a barrier.67 Some surface units were transferred to the Greeks on 
an ad-hoc basis, but nothing was formally enshrined until the signing of the Anglo-
Hellenic Military Cooperation Agreement in March 1942. This agreement officially 
placed the Greeks under RN operational control and involved a direct commitment 
to lend them warships.68 It included submarines, and one British and one captured 
Italian vessel were later given.
Politically, having Greek military assistance would not just add to Churchill’s 
“United Nations” concept, but could work towards strengthening Anglo-Greek 
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relations in general. The primary British aim regarding Greece throughout the 
war was to retain influence there. As the deputy head of the Foreign Office, 
Orme Sargent, put it in 1943, “Greece is and always has been a vital interest.”69 
Any future return to the continent via the Balkans and maintenance of postwar 
influence would benefit greatly from both a favorable Greek population and Greek 
government to be put in place after liberation. The British had recognized that the 
Greek government-in-exile was not representative of Greece in general and that 
the king did not hold great popularity, but it was all they had to work with at first. 
Effective use of the Greek armed forces could be one strand of a stated policy to 
improve its standing amongst the Greek population.70 
British policy regarding Greece quickly became much more convoluted due to 
the intransigence of the king and government-in-exile, their increasing alienation 
from the Greek population, and the increasing popularity and success of communist-
leaning resistance groups there. This had little effect on the Greek navy though, 
which over 1941–1943 cooperated effectively with the RN. Their submarine force 
operated in the most crucial areas of the Mediterranean, with S10 from Malta and 
S1 from Egypt and the Levant. They worked within the key roles of interdicting 
Axis shipping to North Africa and also in the Adriatic and Aegean, often bringing 
praise from RN officers.71 They were thus able to become the most successful of the 
various Allied submarine forces in the theatre in terms of sinkings.
Over this period, dissatisfaction with the government-in-exile over the lack 
of left-leaning representation had increased. Subsequent unrest bled into the 
Greek army and led to several incidents of unrest.72 The navy remained relatively 
insulated from this thanks to a heavily “royalist” leaning in its recruitment. This 
selective approach was ended in spring 1943 thanks to several changes in related 
areas of the Greek naval command. Among the lower ranks, there was increasing 
support for the communist-leaning guerillas and organizations in Greece.73 Some 
minor incidents of unrest took place over 1943–1944, but the situation reached a 
head in April 1944 with a full-blown naval mutiny at Alexandria. 
Greek ships refused to sail until the government-in-exile included 
representatives of the resistance groups. Although a fuming Churchill authorized 
the use of force by the RN, it was in the end left to loyalist Greek elements to 
resolve the situation themselves. In the aftermath, the Greek navy temporarily 
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ceased operations through a combination of British restriction and a lack of 
personnel after arrests. Operations for the navy as a whole did not resume at a 
meaningful level until late July. Churchill determined that no more warships 
would be leant to the Greeks, as he felt they could end up contributing to a Greek 
civil war. Transfers that were already planned were quickly cancelled.74
Yet in spite of such events, three of the Greek submarines were once again 
fully manned by mid-May, although with RN-supplied telegraphists.75 This 
was likely a security measure, and much of the replacement personnel had gone 
through training with a submarine liaison officer from S1, which probably 
included a vetting process. Greek submarines were among the first vessels to 
restart operations, heading to sea as of late May and restarting patrols in early 
June. They were once again sent back to the main offensive operating area at this 
stage—the Aegean. The only notable restriction to Greek submarine operations 
imposed by the British was that the Papanicolos, some of whose crew had been at 
the heart of the mutiny, was assigned to A/S training at Gibraltar instead.76 It 
remained there until the return to Greece in October. 
The situation regarding MNC had returned to something approaching normal 
despite a full mutiny, and there were two main reasons. The first was the sheer need for 
the Greek forces at a time when so many RN vessels had been withdrawn from the 
theatre. The C-in-C Mediterranean complained in May that the lack of Greek ships 
had “seriously handicapped” him.77 The second was the issue of postwar influence 
in Greece. The stated British policy was outlined in May as “to retain Greece as a 
British sphere of influence and to prevent Russian domination of Greece which 
would gravely prejudice our strategical position in the eastern Mediterranean.”78 
That month the British had begun planning a military return to Greece in the light 
of an expected future German withdrawal. The plan was to reinstall a reformed 
government-in-exile, and forestall a takeover by the communist elements of the 
resistance. In order for this to be successful, the government would have to be viewed 
as legitimate by the Greek people, and so the involvement of Greek forces was a 
necessity. As Harold Macmillan, resident minister in the Mediterranean, noted: 
“The Greek government must not appear to be under our political influence—from 
the point of view of either their public or ours!”79 When the operation came, the 
government was transported in Greek ships, and the Greek navy took a visible part 
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overall. MNC had been rescued by political need, resulting in the Greeks returning 
to the forefront of submarine warfare.
A similar situation did not exist regarding the French after the Allied landings 
in North-West Africa, November 1942, had brought the question of Allied control 
of the Vichy navy back to the fore again. While Admiral Francois Darlan’s switch of 
allegiance from Vichy had potentially brought large quantities of naval resources into 
the Allied cause, the political situation was extremely complex. In December 1942, 
Admiral Jacques Moreau (commanding French naval forces in Algeria) met with 
Cunningham on behalf of Darlan, expressing desire for the French navy’s re-entry to 
the war effort, and to coordinate arrangements for it. Moreau suggested establishing 
one French liaison officer at Gibraltar to coordinate convoys between Casablanca and 
Dakar and another in London, initially to oversee French shipping interests.80
The need for a liaison officer based at Gibraltar was generally accepted within 
the Admiralty, as “a French liaison officer can be regarded as part of the military 
arrangements between the Allied Forces and the Darlan administration.” However, 
the installation of a liaison officer in London was thought likely to be interpreted 
negatively by the Free French as a “rather more definite acknowledgement of the 
Darlan regime.” Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that for effective MNC to take 
place, it would be greatly beneficial to have both these liaison officers in place. The 
installation of an officer in London would also likely have an important quid pro 
quo element in ensuring French cooperation.81
British policy, later crystallised at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, 
was to encourage the French factions to work together with a view to permanent 
re-integration in the future.82 The diplomatic and broader military reasons for this 
were numerous and beyond the scope of this study, but in naval terms it would ease 
cooperation with and bring important resources to the Allied side and hopefully 
encourage French elements elsewhere to join the Allies. As Cunningham put it, 
“It is evidently a matter of great urgency to get the two naval factions together if 
we are to start working with French ships out here.”83 He urged finding French 
officers who would be agreeable to both factions in order to begin negotiations. 
The problem of finding the right people was a thorny one though. The suggested 
French officer (Delaye) for Gibraltar brought broad British support, from 
Cunningham, the Foreign Office, and the Admiralty. This was temporarily thrown 
into sharp relief when the British military attaché in Madrid, who had previously 
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worked with Delaye, provoked suspicions he would simply act as a Vichy spy.84 He 
was briefly blocked from taking up the position, but concerns were later dismissed 
and the post was created in January 1943. Questions did continue to be raised 
over Delaye’s suitability, along with accusations about his spreading anti-British 
sentiment, but he remained in place.85
The question of a liaison officer in London ran on for much longer. The 
suggestion by Darlan of Admiral Raymond Fenard for the post was perceived as 
something that could drive a wedge between De Gaulle and the FFNF. There were 
suspicions that it might have been devised by Darlan for just such a purpose.86 
Another candidate was rejected immediately after being described as a “thoroughly 
bad lot” who was “altogether unacceptable.” An alternative suggested by Darlan’s 
de facto successor, Henri Giraud, was rejected for his “difficulty and intransigence” 
towards working with the British.87
By February, there was renewed optimism that the situation could be resolved. 
The death of Darlan in December 1942, the establishment of liaison officers at 
Gibraltar and Freetown, and the acceptance by the French of BNLOs on their 
warships were all pointed to as indicators of significant progress. The argument 
for a renewed effort gained support across Whitehall.88 Yet even after the official 
joint establishment of the French Committee for National Liberation, a report 
on Allied naval contingents in June noted that “The arrangement so far reached 
between General De Gaulle and Giraud has not yet led to any rearrangement in 
the administration of the respective naval forces, which continue to function as 
before.” It was only in August, after the FFNF were fused with the French navy in 
North Africa into the “Marine Nationale” and a single naval HQ was created at 
Algiers, that the UK naval mission was established.89 
The lack of détente between the French factions and the drawn-out process 
of implementing a structure for improved MNC were having a direct effect on 
submarine warfare at a time when the British were turning all available vessels 
against Axis shipping to Tunisia.90 The Free French had pressed the Admiralty 
to station all their submarines in the Mediterranean in spring 1943, which would 
have been in line with British wishes. Yet the PNLO reported that after the failure 
to reach a more concrete agreement with Giraud’s faction, Free French policy 
had been reversed and they now wanted them kept out of the Mediterranean 
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entirely.91 This was particularly unfortunate as the FFNF submarines had been 
singled out as their “high point” in terms of efficiency and fighting spirit.92 In the 
end only a single Free French submarine was sent, at a later date. 
Mechanical issues were to be a major factor in the use of any of the French 
forces, as they had suffered from varying levels of neglect under Vichy due to 
the restrictive terms of the armistice agreement.93 Repairs and refits would be 
required in many cases before operations could commence. British priorities for 
the French navy, laid down in January 1943, listed submarines as third in order of 
importance, behind ocean-going destroyers to be used for escort operations, and 
cruisers for anti-raider work. The submarines would be split, depending on their 
mechanical states, between those for active operational work and those to be used 
for A/S training purposes.94 
Difficulties of relations between the French factions and of the time required 
for refits meant progress was slow in returning their submarines to operations. The 
resulting effects on the morale of the French crews and on MNC in general were 
very negative. A potential solution was proposed by the captain of S8 in May 1943. 
He noted the poor state of the submarines, but also  the large numbers of highly 
trained officers and ratings who would perform well given a chance. He suggested 
that providing them with a “U” class submarine would be cheaper than excessive 
refits and would greatly encourage French cooperation. Cunningham latched on 
to this idea, suggesting that currently there was genuine enthusiasm for combat 
operations, but constant involvement solely in A/S training would irrevocably 
damage morale. “Dangling the bait” of a submarine would not just make better 
use of the trained personnel, but would also improve MNC by making the French 
more willing to do the less attractive jobs.95
The suggestion brought a slew of negative reactions from within the Admiralty. 
Cunningham was told that the current policy was not to lend any warships other 
than auxiliaries to the Giraudist French, but also that they had yet to earn the right. 
After all, “The Greeks, for example, had to serve a long apprenticeship on active 
service against the enemy, making the best of their antiquated submarines before 
they were given a new one” and “it has been an invariable rule and a matter of 
principle that new construction British submarines are not offered to our allies until 
they have proved themselves.”96 Instead, those few French submarines that could 
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be repaired and made ready for offensive operations would be, but this would take 
a lower priority than the majority, which would get minimal refits to act as targets 
for A/S training. This included sending many out of the theatre to work in the 
Caribbean where they could free up British and American vessels from the role.97 
An opportunity to “prove themselves” would simply never come. The concept of 
offering a submarine might well have improved MNC, as it had done with other 
Allied nations, but it fell afoul of two interlinked issues: first, doing so would alienate 
other allies; and second, the distrustful attitudes of the British towards those who 
had been involved with Vichy. It is worth noting that over the same period in early 
1943, the British leant a new submarine to the FFNF (renamed Curie), which was 
later sent to the Mediterranean with a captain who had served in S9.98 
The complication of matters for MNC caused by the absorption of the 
former Vichy French was further exacerbated by the adoption of the new Italian 
government under Pietro Badoglio as “co-belligerents.” The guiding line for the 
organisation and disposition of the Italian fleet came from a pact signed between 
Cunningham and the Italian Minister for Marine, Raffaele De Courten. Known 
as the “Cunningham-De Courten agreement,” it stated that “Such ships as can 
be employed to actively assist in the Allied effort will be kept in commission 
and be used under the orders of the C-in-C Mediterranean, as may be arranged 
between the Allied C-in-C and the Italian Government.”99 Under the agreement, 
a high-ranking flag officer was set to act in a liaison role with the Italian Ministry 
of Marine at Taranto, dealing with administrative issues, handling problems of 
liaison, and disseminating orders from the C-in-C Mediterranean. The Badoglio 
government was generally keen to agree to the use of their forces as co-belligerents 
on Allied terms. Doing so would hopefully ensure Italy a significant place in 
postwar Europe, with retention of her sovereign territory.100 For the Italian navy, 
it could ensure that they retain ownership of as much of it as possible for the 
remainder of the war, and after its end. This view appears to have been maintained 
by the Minister for Marine through 1944.101 From the Italian perspective, the 
more willing and effective their military assistance to the Allies could be, the 
greater the likelihood of a positive outcome for them on both issues.
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For the Allies it created yet another difficult situation. Having the Italians 
as co-belligerents could help ease the passage of Allied forces in Italy. In the case 
of their navy and naval authorities, this could, and did, mean important aid in 
clearing and opening vital ports quickly.102 Recognizing a declared anti-fascist 
government in Italy was also seen as an important psychological blow for the Axis. 
Yet entering some form of alliance with the Italians could be seen as working too 
closely with men who had previously been key figures in a fascist regime, while 
it was also expected to alienate the French, Greeks, and Yugoslavs. It was for this 
reason that a “co-belligerent” status was recognised rather than an alliance.103
Allied designs on the Italian fleet were rather different to the Italian intention. 
In a meeting of the British War Cabinet, it was suggested that parts of the fleet be 
taken over by Allied crews and used where required, although escort forces could 
continue to run with Italian crews. In the case of the large submarine force, it was 
suggested that the ocean-going types could be manned by British or American 
crews and sent to the Far East. The rest would be useful for A/S purposes, for 
which there was always a demand, or “no doubt would be acceptable if offered to 
smaller Allied Navies.”104 
The possibility of transferring Italian submarines was quickly seized on by 
some. The captain of S8 once again suggested that the French would benefit from 
being given either British or Italian vessels, although he accepted the former was 
unlikely. He reported varying states of competency, morale, and willingness among 
the French crews at Oran, from the “efficient performance” of the Casabianca to 
the crew of Perle, who were “timid in the extreme.” He noted that there was a 
general willingness to get on patrol, but that material deficiencies among the 
old boats were seriously hampering this. The transfer of submarines would be 
the “only remedy” to further decreasing morale and could get the most from the 
best crews.105 Similarly, the C-in-C Levant requested three of the most modern 
Italian submarines to be transferred to the Greeks stationed with him. Two of 
these would replace losses they had incurred, while a third would allow the use of 
experienced spare crew members.106 However, it was decided that the transfer of 
Italian submarines to the French would be considered “impolitic in light of the 
cooperation being given by the Italians.” Giving Italian submarines to the Greeks 
was ruled out as it would likely raise requests directly from the French, although it 
was noted that giving them to the Dutch or Polish could be acceptable.107 
The British found themselves faced with a fundamental problem regarding 
the Italians. As Macmillan summarised:
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On the one hand, we want to get the Italian Navy, naval bases, 
dockyards and workshops to cooperate with us; on the other we 
want to take physical possession of their ships, give some to the 
Russians, some to the Greeks, some to the French, some to the 
Yugoslavs and some to ourselves, leaving at the end of the war a 
weak or non-existent Italian Navy in the Mediterranean.108
The need for Italian submarines that were manned by Italians was minimal, but 
the need for their repair facilities and surface escort forces was significant. Removing 
the former could hamper the will and efficiency of the latter.109 Treading this difficult 
line meant no submarines were transferred. British policy towards cooperation with 
the French thus remained unchanged despite the opportunity offered through 
Italian resources. They would not affect any great repairs to the French submarines 
or allow them any significant operational role in the Mediterranean. The few 
capable submarines that were classified as “Operational” were allowed to conduct 
some limited offensive patrols in the western Mediterranean, and special operations 
such as landing stores and agents in Corsica and Southern France.110 The rest were 
divided between those allocated to A/S training roles, and those that would simply 
be “laid up.” By June 1944, only five of the eighteen in the Mediterranean were 
considered operational and only four as appropriate for A/S training. The rest were 
laid up and considered useless.111
While there were political problems with allotting Italian resources to the 
other Allies, allowing the Italians to operate significantly themselves would bring 
about others. The recognition of the Italians as co-belligerents was seen one factor 
in the ever-lowering popularity of the Greek government-in-exile among the Greek 
population. Indeed, it was doing the image of the British no favours with the Greeks 
either, and enemy propaganda had been rife in exacerbating this situation.112 The 
British desire to maintain influence in postwar Greece has already been noted. 
Increasing cooperation with the much-loathed Italians could endanger this.
There were also practical issues of the mechanical state of the Italian forces. 
The co-belligerent submarines were in varying states of repair. It was thought 
that most required a short refit, but they were generally “no worse than the 
French.” The recommendation by C-in-C Mediterranean was that six should be 
used for supply purposes in the Aegean, two for operations in the Adriatic, and 
four for power supply to Naples. The rest that could be made operable should 
be consigned to A/S training roles. Seven were deemed not worth refitting at 
all and consigned for scrapping.113 Even this limited level of assignment proved 
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difficult. Five submarines did briefly operate in a supply role during the abortive 
Dodecanese campaign of late 1943, but their involvement was soon limited due 
to serious mechanical problems.114 The only active operations conducted were 
a small number in the Adriatic by two vessels, picking up stranded pockets of 
Italians from the eastern coast and landing agents and saboteurs.115
The question of where the Italian navy could operate was greatly constrained 
by political issues relating to the other nations. The Allied military government in 
Italy had decreed that Italian ships were not allowed to enter Greek or Yugoslav 
ports “for political reasons.”116 Keeping them separate from the French and 
Greeks became a preoccupation. When the Greek submarine Matrozos (formerly 
the captured Italian Perla), arrived at Taranto dockyard in July 1944, Italian 
dockworkers and naval personnel were sufficiently incensed that they threw bricks 
at the Greek crew. The British flag officer at the port threatened to post armed 
guards in the event of further incidents. After a series of altercations between French 
and Italian personnel and workers at Taranto in mid-1944, the British were forced 
to cancel shore leave for French sailors there.117 Even sending the submarines for 
A/S training purposes was complex. The main base in theatre for such activity was 
at Oran, where the French were based. As the C-in-C Mediterranean warned the 
Admiralty, “It should be borne in mind that the French and Italians are not, repeat 
not, a good mixture,” a view they agreed with.118 A reduced number were sent 
to Oran and kept separate from the French, conducting a more limited scope of 
exercises than first planned. An easier option was to send them out of the theatre 
entirely, and eight were sent to Bermuda instead. These combined political and 
technical reasons left the Italian submarines sitting largely idle for the rest of the 
war, but also prevented them from being transferred to other Allies.
Conclusions
Allied submarines operating under British control formed a significant 
proportion of the total effort in the Mediterranean from April 1941. This had 
increased to around half the total proportion by the middle of 1943 and formed 
the overwhelming majority by the end of that year. In spite of such a large presence 
and the importance of submarine warfare, they achieved relatively little and failed 
to have a great impact on the war in the Mediterranean. This was primarily due to 
difficulties in MNC.
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The British had built up an effective framework for MNC in the home 
theatre, and S9 was representative of what it could achieve. The amalgamation 
of those submarines in a single “parent unit” eased the difficulties of different 
languages, cultures, equipment, procedures, and so on. This then allowed the 
Allied crews to prove themselves to skeptics over their involvement through 
successful operations, and so prompted the RN to lend them further submarines. 
By contrast, no dedicated flotilla was ever set up in the Mediterranean, and it 
would almost certainly have proved impossible. Certainly the Dutch and Polish 
vessels that had served with S9 were able to integrate quickly thanks to the 
progress that had already been made in the home theatre, and were sent where 
they were most required. MNC involving them, and initially the Greeks, was 
generally smooth. The total number of submarines was far too vast for a single 
flotilla, but multinational groupings (or even multifactional in the French case) of 
any form were to prove difficult or impossible. The French factions were eventually 
integrated, but the formation of a structure for MNC and getting them to work 
together took a long time. Meanwhile, a crucial period for submarine warfare 
during the war in Tunisia slipped by with the French mostly sitting idle. Even 
after French integration, activity was very limited, as was cooperation with the 
RN. Even brief or chance meetings between the Greeks/French and their former 
enemy, the Italians, ended in problems. 
The fact that the French and Greeks did not wish to work with the Italians is 
hardly surprising given their previous hostilities and the manner in which Italy had 
declared war on each of them. Yet British control of the co-belligerent Italian navy 
actually offered an opportunity to improve MNC with the French and Greeks 
by offering them Italian resources. This could have allayed some of the serious 
mechanical problems that were being suffered and encouraged greater activity 
from the French in particular, including the opportunity to “prove themselves.” 
However, this fell afoul of a need to maintain the international perception of co-
belligerency and the level of Italian cooperation that was already underway. The 
need to promote cooperation with the French was not strong enough to overcome 
this. There was more appetite relating to the Greeks because of British hopes for 
postwar influence, as shown by the willingness to restore MNC after their mutiny. 
Yet giving them Italian submarines was seen to be too difficult to achieve without 
further damaging strained relations with the French. The delicate balance over 
relations had to be maintained.
While there were certainly always difficulties relating to MNC in the home 
theatre, the various nations were united in a desire to defeat the Axis powers that 
had exiled them. In the Mediterranean, the additions included nations who had 
previously been hostile neutrals or enemies. For the British in 1940–1941, there 
was a pressing need for all available resources and manpower, and for showing a 
united international front in the continued war effort. By the time the serious 
difficulties relating to MNC in the Mediterranean appeared, that need had vastly 
decreased, as the British were part of one of the most powerful alliances the world 
had ever seen. In the end, divisions such as those between the French factions, the 
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French and the Italians, or the Greeks and Italians, and the complex dynamics of 
Mediterranean politics were too great to overcome. The best the British managed 
to do was segregate the difficult nations and “sideline” a large portion of their 
forces, consigning large quantities of men and materiel to minor operations or 
even nothing at all, in spite of a need for the submarines. 
Jones was quite right to praise the effort of the British and Allied nations in S9 in 
forming the basis for, and the conduct of, successful multinational naval operations in 
the home theatre when the conditions were favorable. It set an important foundation 
for MNC within NATO, and stands as an important case study for the RN in what 
can be achieved within alliances. The Mediterranean, however, demonstrated the 
limits of what could be achieved in a complex and prohibitive situation. Ultimately, 
MNC was poor, and led to the under-use of a large quantity of manpower and 
equipment, something that might have otherwise benefitted an overstretched RN. 
It represents another important case study of the difficulties in operating alongside 
partners outside of a traditional formal alliance.
